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Abstract 
 
Framing effects, which may induce decision-makers to demonstrate preference description 
invariance violation for logically equivalent options varying in semantic emphasis, are an 
economically significant decision bias and an active area of research. Framing is an issue inter 
alia for the way in which options are presented in stated-choice studies where (often 
inadvertent) semantic emphasis may impact on preference responses. While research into both 
espoused preference effects and its cognitive substrate is highly active, interpretation and 
explanation of preference anomalies is beset by variation in the underlying structure of 
problems and latitude for decision-maker elaboration. A formal, general scheme for making 
transparent the parameter and proposition structure of framed decision stimuli is described. 
Interpretive and cognitive explanations for framing effects are reviewed. The formalism’s 
potential for describing extant, generating new stimulus tasks, detailing decision-maker task 
elaboration. The approach also provides a means of formalising stated-choice response stimuli 
and provides a metric of decision stimuli complexity. An immediate application is in the 
structuring of stated-choice test instruments. 
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Introduction 
 
Risk taking behaviour of individuals, small groups and organisations is subject to two avenues 
of research. A normative tradition that informs management science and operations analysis 
deduces optimal decisions from assumption of instrumental rationality, utility maximisation 
and Bayesian information efficiency. A complementary descriptive tradition takes a positive 
approach to the reality of decision-making. Contrasting findings between the two reveals that 
real decision-making is cognitively ‘rich’ with actual choice and preference demonstrating a 
series of systematic deviations – referred to as decision biases or anomalies - from normative 
precepts. One anomaly that has been extensively researched under both laboratory and 
ecological conditions is the ‘framing effect’ (Tversky & Kahneman 1981; 1986) where rating 
of a single option or preference between available options (usually, but not inevitably a pair) 
is reversed depending on the semantic emphasis of the outcome description even though those 
presentations are, at face, logically equivalent. This represents an ostensible violation of 
expected utility description invariance. 
 
This paper addresses a lacuna by developing a formal, rigorous and quite general logical 
representation of decision problems proposed to be subject to the framing effect in earlier 
literature. It complements Levin, et al’s (1998) tubular representation of framing problem 
structure. Such formalism is practical and has value in the analysis of extant decision 
problems and creation of well-defined novel problem stimulus, including those in stated-
choice instruments. The formalism makes clear that the scope for stimulus problem 
construction is far greater than those currently subjected to experimental investigation. The 
formalism is also of use in revealing decision construal in ecological settings and can inform 
the development of prescriptive technologies to debias and enhance professional decision-
making. It also makes explicit logical and outcome / risk facets of problem structure that have 
been suggested to be of import to framing effects and are called upon as a basis for their 
explanation. The distinction between risky choice, attribute and goal framing highlighted by 
Levin, et al (1998) is emphasised. Examples of framed decision stimuli from a transport 
context are developed. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First an outline of Prospect Theory, which provides the 
primary conceptual platform for explaining framing effect, is presented. Its predictions are 
contrasted with those of normative expected utility theory (EUT). This is followed by a brief 
review of framing effects in which investigation of business arena decisions, framing 
typology (a distinction between risky choice, attribute and goal framing), proposed 
explanations and outstanding research issues are discussed. This discussion makes a strong 
case for the relevance and value of the proposed formalism. The formalism is then expiated. 
Elements common to all three types of framing problem are discussed first with elements 
specific to the formalisation of risk choice, attribute and goal framing following. The paper 
concludes with comments on how the formalism may be extended to accommodate more 
general and ecologically relevant features of stated-choice decision challenges. 
 
 
Prospect Theory: An overview  
 
Most decisions are taken in the face of uncertainty. Outcomes vary in their degree of 
desirability and likelihood. Actions must be taken in light of their potential to deliver 
preferred outcomes and to ameliorate, if not eliminate, risk. The normative approach to 
decision under risk (established in the early post-war years by inter alios von-Neumann & 
Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954)) dictates optimal preferences under objective and 
 2
 subjective risk respectively on the basis of a set of consistency axioms and a target of 
expected utility maximisation. Decision-makers are presumed be computationally efficient, 
logically omniscient and properly Bayesian in deriving beliefs from available information. 
This tradition informs much management science, finance theory and operations analysis. It 
provides a platform for stated-choice methodologies. 
 
The empirical predictions of normative theory have stimulated a tradition of experimental and 
ecological evaluation of human decision making under a variety of situations to assess the 
extent to which it is truly ‘rational’ on an aggregated and (increasingly) individual level. This 
descriptive tradition has generated extensive evidence that actual decision-making rarely 
meets with normative precepts. Further, preference deviations are not random but tend to be 
distorted in a systematic and consistent way. This has led to the development of descriptive 
models of decision-making under risk that generalise expected utility theory in an attempt to 
better map the reality of choice and preference (Reviews are offered by Schoemaker (1982), 
Sugden (1986), Weber & Camerer (1987), Machina (1987), Fishburn (1988a ; 1988b), 
Camerer (1989), Munier (1989), Camerer & Weber (1992), Starmer (2000).  
 
Of these generalisations, Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman 1992) has proved to be the most successful in stimulating research and providing a 
basis of descriptive accounts of practical decision-making. Prospect theory has a number of 
postulates that distinguish it from expected utility theory. Consider a decision-maker facing a 
prospect,  , that is a set of discrete outcomes  
x ฀⊂ X , x = (x1 ,…, xn) , to which the decision-maker assigns a utility U : X ฀→  over a 
probability distribution p = (p1 ,…, pn) , p ฀∈ [0 , 1] , i pi = 1 . Prospect Theory suggests that 
decision-makers evaluate potential changes in asset position, x = (x – r) relative to an initial 
reference point, r , rather than final asset position. Such changes are psychologically coded as 
gains (x > 0) or losses (x ฀≤ 0). It further proposes that the utility function has a specific 
shape (S-shaped: concave in gains, convex in losses discontinuous at the reference point) such 
that gains tend to induce preference for risk averse options while losses induce preference for 
risk seeking options. Further, probabilities are not entertained unmodified, but are weighted as 
a function w(p) with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 but with a typical pattern of low probabilities, p<< 
being overweighted and moderate to high probabilities, p> being underweighted  
w(p<<) > p<< , w(p>) < p> .     
 
In total, whereas expected utility theory suggests a prospect should be (rationally) valued as 
VEUT() = u(y , 1) = i u(xi) pi , Prospect Theory proposes that the prospect is valued as 
VPT() = u(y , 1) = i v(xi)w(pi) , where v is the value function that has the properties of a 
utility function over asset changes. 
 
The switch from risk aversion in gains to risk seeking in losses is manifest as two distinct 
(though often confused, see Fagley 1993 and Li 1998) decision phenomena. The reflection 
effect occurs when a decision-maker prefers one (usually the less risky) of two prospects +s 
 
+
r when gains are involved (฀∀x > 0) , but refers the other (usually the riskier) option when 
gains are reflected to losses (฀∀x ฀→ -x) ฀⇒ -s  -r . As the gain and loss prospects are 
logically distinct, this reversal in preference might reflect consistent preferences and so is not 
necessarily irrational. The framing effect, on the other hand, relates to an inversion of 
preference between options differing in risk when logically identical pairs of prospects are 
presented with descriptions that differ only in semantic emphasis: if the description is in terms 
of affectively positive aspects or outcomes (gains, opportunities, improvement or attractive 
features) then risk aversion usually results; if the description is in terms of affectively 
negative (and antonymic to the positive) aspects or outcomes (losses, threats, depreciations or 
unattractive features) then risk seeking ensues. The reversal may be observed intra-participant 
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 when the two versions are presented to the same individual on different (cognitively isolated) 
occasions and inter-participant when the reversal is manifest as a shift in modal preference 
between comparable groups. 
 
The two descriptions are logically equivalent assuming that the negative description is 
antonymic to the positive and reference to set partitions switched. Hence the preference 
reversal is ostensibly irrational (the need for this qualification will become apparent later). 
Prospect Theory accounts for the framing effect as a consequence of the decision-maker 
psychologically coding positive descriptions as gains and negative as losses so inducing risk 
averse and risk seeking preferences respectively.  
 
 
Framing effects: Typology, examples and explanations 
 
Explicit attention to framing effects was first drawn by Tversky & Kahneman (1981) with the 
now canonical ‘Asian Disease’ problem. An initial semantically common context was set 
with: 
 
“Imagine the US is preparing for the outbreak of an usual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs have been prepared to combat 
the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows:” 
 
Two versions of the choice set (two options, forced choice) then follow, one with a ‘positive’ 
frame emphasising ‘lives saved’: 
 
“If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved” 
 
The other with a ‘negative’ frame emphasising ‘deaths’: 
 
“If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
 
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die.” 
 
Assuming that ‘die’ and ‘saved’ are complete and mutually exclusive, and that  
‘die’ ฀≡ ‘(not) saved’ and ‘saved’ ฀≡ ‘(not) die’ then the consequences of Program A ฀≡ Program 
C and Program B ฀≡ Program D. Under expected utility theory it is presumed that such 
invariance should not influence preference. Yet Tversky & Kahneman (1981) found that when 
presented to different participant groups 72% (n = 152) preferred the ‘safe’ (certain outcome) 
Program A (coded as gains) and 78% (n = 155) preferred the ‘risky’ (probabilistic outcome) 
Program D (coded as losses). Given the assumptions above, this inter-participant preference 
reversal is an ostensible violation of strategic invariance.  
 
Follow up studies by Tversky and Kahneman (1986) demonstrated the robustness of the effect 
with a series of alternative problems adopting the same two-choice: safe-risky template. 
Further studies into the effect (largely for business-context decisions) have been undertaken 
by Neale & Bazerman (1985) and Schurr (1987) for bargaining, Qualls & Puto (1989) for 
industrial buying, Roszkowski & Snelbecker (1990) for financial planning, Schneider & Eble 
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 (1994) for employment, Schoorman, et al (1994) for company acquisition and disposal and 
Chang, et al (2002) for accounting decisions. These studies largely confirmed the framing 
effect as found by Tversky & Kahneman (1981; 1986) and demonstrated that professional 
decision makers are as subject to it as naive. Real financial incentives do not eliminate the 
effect and may even exacerbate it (Camerer, 1995:635; Kühberger, et al, 2002). Highhouse, et 
al (1996) demonstrated contrast effects in the framing of business issues as opportunities or 
threats. Decision-makers exposed to unequivocal opportunities framed equivocal issues as 
threats and vice versa.   
 
A meta-study by Kühberger (1998) of 136 published experimental studies found the gain – 
risk averse to loss – risk seeking violation of invariance to be robust. However, subtle 
variations in problem structure such as problem arena, framing by reference point shift or 
outcome salience, response mode (forced choice or rating), qualitative or quantitative risk 
description and single or multiple initiator events were influential on the extent of the effect. 
All of these issues are relevant to stated-choice survey instruments. So too was whether the 
effect was measured on an inter- or intra-participant basis (see also Stanovich (1999:107) for 
discussion of divergence between the two). Zickar & Highhouse (1998) summarise 
outstanding issues in decision framing research as including individual differences in 
susceptibility, frame response consistency and framing arena effects. The formalism proposed 
in this paper makes transparent subtle variation in problem structure, parameters and logic and 
can support investigation into these issues.  
 
The Asian Disease problem (and those using it as a logical template) represents choice over 
alternative options varying in risk. However, as Levin, et al (1998) point out in a major review 
of framing effects, the issue of framing has been extended (often without overt recognition) to 
two other types of problem that are of quite different structure: attribute framing in which 
(logically, but not semantically equivalent) alternative descriptions of salient characteristics of 
an item (item set) impact on object selection or rating and goal framing in which the 
consequences of action or inaction are framed with the persuasiveness of the message to 
undertake action being influenced.  
 
The simplest form of attribute framing will be familiar to marketers who prefer to label a food 
product as ‘90% fat free’ rather than (the logically equivalent) ‘contains 10% fat’. As might 
be expected, description in terms of the positive attribute description is usually rated more 
highly than that with the negative description. Levin & Gaeth (1988) found that for a beef 
product not only was the positively labelled product rated more highly, but also that in 
gustatory tests consumers actually reported that it tasted better. 
 
A number of studies have been conducted to ascertain the impact of attribute framing for 
problems with this template have been conducted. These include decisions in resource 
allocation (Duchon, et al 1989; Dunegan 1993; 1995; Dunegan, et al 1995), penalties for 
deceptive advertising (Dunegan 1996), financial control systems (Emby 1994) and joint 
business ventures (Highhouse & Yüce 1996).  
 
A more complex example of attribute framing (one that involves pairwise choice rather than 
rating, multiple attributes and probabilistic rather than certain attributes) might be as follows: 
 
“You are making a business trip and need to be at your destination for a particular 
time. The train journey is 50 minutes. You have a choice between three trains.  
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 In the positive frame: 
 
08:30 train: There is a 95% chance that you will arrive on time, and a 60% chance that you 
will get a seat for the entire journey. 
 
09:00 train: There is an 85% chance that you will arrive on time, and an 80% chance that 
you will not get a seat for the entire journey. 
 
09:30 train: There is an 80% chance that you will arrive on time, and a 90% chance that 
you will get a seat for the entire journey. 
 
Which train would you prefer? 
 
In the negative frame: 
 
08:30 train: There is a 5% chance that you will be late, and a 40% chance that you will not 
get a seat and have to stand for the entire journey. 
 
09:00 train: There is a 15% chance that you will be late, and a 20% chance that you will 
not get a seat and have to stand for the entire journey. 
 
09:30 train: There is a 20% chance that you will be late, and a 10% chance that you will 
not get a seat and have to stand for the entire journey. 
 
Which train would you prefer? 
Such a stimulus might be used to investigate how individuals were willing to play off arrival 
time risk against journey comfort. These descriptions are equivalent given that the attributes 
‘arrive on time and ‘be late’ and ‘get a seat’ and ‘have to stand’ both constitute exclusive and 
complete sets. The proposed formalism captures more general problems of this type with the 
‘single item rating – certain attribute’ template a sub-type. 
 
Levin, et al (1998) define goal framing as ‘a positive emphasis on the goal of obtaining a 
positive consequence as opposed to the negative emphasis on avoiding a negative 
consequence’. In both cases the same action (referred to as a project in this formalism) and 
consequence is being promoted. However the persuasiveness of the message is frame 
sensitive. It is usually the case that the action presents some short-term cost or inconvenience 
to the decision-maker. A simple example of goal framing in the travel choice arena is, in a 
positive frame: 
 
“Leaving earlier increases your chance of arriving on time”; 
 
Versus the negative frame: 
 
“Not leaving earlier increases your chance of being late”. 
 
This template of ‘for a single project: do and achieve good – not do and face bad, (with 
certainty)’ is dominant in goal framing studies. This does however represent only a small 
subspace of possible goal framing problem types. The generalisation within the proposed 
formalism occurs along three dimensions. First the possibility of selecting between alternative 
projects rather than just accepting (rejecting) or rating a single project is entertained; 
secondly, the projects are considered to offer desired consequences at a probability rather than 
for certain (this introduces the notion of the project’s instrumentality); thirdly, projects are 
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 regarded as symmetric in that they can prevent the delivery of (negative) consequences as 
well as help ensure those with a positive (projects might have a negative instrumentality as 
well as positive). 
 
For example, in the arena of congestion charging: 
 
In a positive frame: 
 
Would you support a congestion charge of £5 between the hours of 07:00-09:00 in your city 
centre if it had a 90% chance of reducing your travel time of at least 15 minutes and a 60% 
chance of reducing your travel time by at least 30 minutes? 
 
Yes, no? 
 
And in a negative frame: 
 
Would you support a congestion charge of £5 between the hours of 07:00-09:00 in your city 
centre if it had a 10% chance of not reducing your travel time by up to 15 minutes and a 40% 
chance of not reducing your travel time by up to 30 minutes? 
 
Yes, no? 
 
Goal framing has not received the same level of research attention as risky choice framing in 
the most decision arenas. Health choice is perhaps an exception where the impact of health 
improvement messages is important. Goal framing effects have not always been found, but 
where they have, the negative frame usually has the greater impact on espoused behavioural 
intention. Two management arena studies are McCusker & Carnevale (1995) for resource 
deployment and Newberry et al (1993) for tax practitioner behaviour. While risky choice 
framing has capitalised the attention of theorists, the latter two types of framing are likely to 
be of increasing interest in empirical investigation of the practical impact of descriptive 
valence variation on travel choice. 
 
Levin, et al (1998) make it clear that interpretation of causes into framing effects will be 
hindered if these three types of stimulus problem are not clearly delineated. As revealed by 
the proposed formalism, the logical structure of these three types of framing problem is quite 
distinct.  
 
 
 
Explaining framing effects 
 
A number of explanations have been proposed for framing effects that do not call upon 
Prospect Theory’s postulation of value function convexity-concavity. These largely centre on 
problem interpretation, elaboration or comprehension.  
 
An immediate possibility is that individuals do not integrate outcome and probability data in a 
way consistent with expected utility theory, but focus on one particular dimension. If the 
outcome dimension is prioritised in the Asian Disease problem, then the ‘600 saved’ of B 
might be attended in the positive frame while the ‘nobody dies’ of D is attended to in the 
negative frame, thus not inducing (at a perceptual level) invariance violation. If the risk 
dimension is attended to however then preference would be frame sensitive as it is the 
probability of both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes that increase leading to preference for B in the 
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 positive frame and C in the negative. This pattern of preferences is however counter to that of 
the Prospect Theory prediction usually observed. Zickar & Highhouse (1998) develop an Item 
Response Theory (IRT) approach to analysing framing effects. This establishes the 
probability of an individual affirming or rejecting a particular item. Applied to four problems 
with the Asian Disease template they found consistent inter-participant preference for the risk 
averse option in the positive frame and risk seeking in the negative (albeit with some 
statistical anomalies for the original problem). 40% of variance could be accounted for by a 
single factor the authors refer to as preference for risk. 
 
The suggestion of invariance violation is presupposed on the decision-maker sharing the 
problem constructor’s logical intentions of the completeness and exclusivity of descriptive 
antonyms and negations. The constructor also supposes that the decision-maker will regard 
the described outcome conditions as final and not available for elaboration. If the decision-
maker does not share these assumptions then a violation of invariance may not be occurring 
within her interpretation of the problem.   
 
For example, Gigerenzer (1991) suggests that decision-makers do not take the problem 
information at face (Bayesian) value. Rather they construct a Local Mental Model (LMM) of 
the described scenario based on the information provided. Within the LMM of the Asian 
Disease problem, for example, the decision-maker may (reasonably) include the idea that 
‘die’ is a final and unambiguous condition whereas the ‘not saved’ condition (which is not 
made explicit in the problem, it being presumed the decision-maker deduces this and so 
increasing its available for elaboration) is ambiguous and includes the possibility that given 
time and new developments some of these people might be saved later. Further, the decision-
maker may (intuitively) doubt the veracity of the number dying and supposing that it is a 
lower estimate with more people dying later. Both presumptions can remove the burden of 
invariance violation. In a naturalistic context, a ‘buy more time’ strategy rather than 
(immediate) utility maximisation might be considered reasonable. 
 
Reyna & Brainerd (1991) and Reyna & Ellis (1994) apply Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) to the 
framing issue. FTT proposes that rather than processing quantitative data, decision-makers 
develop a qualitative representation of the problem. For the Asian Disease problem this might 
take the form: Program A – ‘Some people will be saved’; Program B – ‘Some people will be 
saved or no one will be saved’; Program C – ‘Some people will die’ and Program D – 
‘Nobody will die or some people will die’. Given that ‘Some people will be saved is common 
to A and B, the unique ‘…no one will be saved’ in B shifts preference to A, while with C and 
D, the ‘(…) some people will die’ is common while the unique ‘Nobody will die’ shifts 
preference to of D.   
 
These competing explanations for the framing effect make specific predictions in relation to 
the influence of changing problem structure, parameters (relative outcome value and 
probabilities), and explicitness of logical assumptions. The proposed formalism is of value in 
that it makes these aspects of the decision problem transparent. Further, it clearly 
distinguishes between risky choice, attribute and goal type problems. The formalism can be 
used to construct decision stimulus problems with specific structural, parametric and logical 
properties.  
 
In addition, the formalism can be used to rigorously analyse decisions as practically construed 
by decision-makers in ecological settings. Application here includes recognition of option 
possibilities and intuitive option framing. Variation in such between different members of 
decision-making groups and resulting impact on group dynamics and decision quality is a 
major research opportunity.  
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Further, consultants and researchers developing prescriptive technologies that enhance 
managerial decision-making are concerned with ‘de-biasing’ technologies that reduce or 
eliminate susceptibility to framing effects. Proposed techniques include development of 
causal cognitive maps of the problem (e.g. Hodkinson, et al 1999), imposing justification for 
the decision made (e.g. Takemura 1994) or evaluation the credibility of the evidence that 
underpins the decision (e.g. Emby & Finley 1997). The formalism provides a tool for 
developing debiasing techniques and empirical evaluation of their performance. 
 
 
Formal description of framed decision problems 
 
After a common initial generalisation, the three types of framing are subject to different 
formalisations. This reflects the divergence in their logical structures.  
 
Framed decision problem common structure  
 
A decision problem,  can be regarded as consisting of three information sets: a context 
setting introduction, K , a set of explicit decision options, A and a set of instructions, T . Thus: 
 = K ฀∧ A ฀∧ T . The context is a set of propositions that instigates the nature and terms of the 
problem. The amount of information in K will vary. A distinction might be made between 
propositions including information that is relevant to the normative interpretation favoured by 
the problem constructor KN and normatively irrelevant ‘filler’ information KD , which may be 
intended to colour interpretation, distract or provide complexity load, so K = KN ฀∧ KD . 
  
The instruction set T is concerned with directing the decision-maker’s response, for example: 
to select one from a set of 2 options (forced choice), to accept or reject a single option, to 
rank options in order of preference or to rate option attractiveness on a numerical or verbal 
scale. A number of studies indicate that such alternative approaches to revealing preference 
may impact on stated preferences in decision in general (Hershey, et al 1982; Farquar 1984) 
and framing in particular (Kühberger, 1998).   
 
Framing is introduced by generating two versions of the decision problem: 
 

ҙ
 = K ฀∧ Aҙ ฀∧ T ,  ҟ = K ฀∧ Aҟҏ฀∧ T 
 
reflecting articulation of the decision-problem in terms of positive and negative valence 
descriptors of the option set respectively. Note that the change in framing usually only 
impacts on the description of options, not the context set K (though potential for manipulating 
context remains). Under positive framing a positive valence lexical term, g and (potentially) 
its negation ฀¬g (where ฀¬ indicates logical negation) are used in the outcome description 
propositions; under negative framing a negative valence lexical term b and (potentially) its 
negation฀¬b are used in the outcome description propositions. Positive valence terms imply 
gain, opportunity, improvement and/or attractiveness. Negative valence lexical terms imply 
loss, threat, depreciation and/or unattractiveness.  
 
g is presumed to be strictly antonymic to b . Syntactically, it is assumed that g ฀≡ ฀¬b , ฀¬g ฀≡ b. 
Further it is assumed that the positive and negative pair are complete and mutually exclusive: 
 = g ฀∪ b , g ฀∩ b = ฀∅ , hence + and - represent logically (but not semantically) equivalent 
representations of the problem. The framing effect is said to occur if preference orderings 
over a preference structure ฀〈A , ฀〉 are inter- or intra-participant inconsistent given a framing 
shift between 
+
 and 
-
 where  is a complete, transitive weak ordering 
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Risky option framing 
 
Under a risky option problem, the decision-maker is presented with a set of N items (which 
may be individuals or a divisible sum of money or other commodity). These items are in an 
initial condition, S0(N) . The item set faces the possibility of an event, E (which may be 
certain or occur with a probability pE ). This event will distribute the items to a partition of 
new conditions,  = {S1 ,…, Sm}, Si ฀∩ Sj = ฀∅ 
 
E(pE) : S0(N) ฀→   
 
It is supposed that the decision-maker has a preference structure ฀〈 , ฀〉 over these 
conditions, ordering such that: S1  S2  ,…,  Sm , where  indicates a complete, transitive 
weak ordering. In general, the partitioning of items occurs over a discrete probability 
distribution, p = {p1 ,…, pz}, ฀∀p ฀∈ [0 , 1] , ipi = 1.  
 
The decision maker is presented with a set of options (acts) A = {A1 ,…, Ay} that might 
ameliorate the partitioning of items into these conditions. It is normally assumed that the 
options are discrete and only one may be taken. 
 
Thus:  
 
(E(pE) | A
j
) : S0(N) ฀→ {(nj11 ฀⊕  nj21 ฀⊕ …฀⊕ njm1); p1} + 
    {(n
j
12 ฀⊕  nj22 ฀⊕ …฀⊕ njm2) ; p2} + ….. + 
    {(n
j
1z ฀⊕  nj2z ฀⊕ …฀⊕ njmz ; pz}  
 
Where, following Luce’s (2000:23) convention the symbol ‘฀⊕’ represents joint receipt and ‘+’ 
probabilistic combination. The term n
j
ki should be read as the number of items out of the set 
S0(N) apportioned to condition Sk , at probability pi given that action A
j
 has been taken in 
response to, or anticipation of event E with  kn
j
ki  = N and i pi  = 1 . This partitioning is 
dependent on E occurring. It is assumed that if E does not occur, then the action taken has no 
impact and all items remain in So(N) . 
 
Each option A
j
 ฀∈ A might then be regarded as being described in terms of a linear 
combination of atomic propositions: 
 
[A
j+
] ฀≡ ฀∧ki [E(pe) | Aj ฀⇒ (njki , S+k , pi)]  
[A
j-
] ฀≡ ฀∧ki [E(pe) | Aj ฀⇒ (njki , S-k , pi)] 
 
Which can be read as “Given that event E occurs (and its probability is pe) and action A
j
 is 
taken then there is a probability pi that n
j
ki items will be transferred to condition S
+/-
k”. The 
+/-
 
superscripts indicate that a positive or negative valence term may be used to describe the 
condition to create the positive and negatively framed problem respectively. The full 
description of act [A
 j
] is a linear combination of propositions over all conditions and 
probabilities 
[1]
.  
 
The numeric distribution to conditions consequential on E given A
j
 ฀∈ A can be depicted by a 
matrix representation (figure 1).  
 
                                                 
[1] Note that in this and all following, Aj , etc. refers to an option while [Aj] , etc. refers to a 
proposition describing that option. 
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Event E 
occurs and 
action Aj is 
taken 
Condition 
 S1 S2 … Sm
p1 n
j
11 n
j
21  … n
j
m1
p2 n
j
12 n
j
12 … n
j
m2
: : :  : 
  
Probability 
pz n
j
1z n
j
2z1 … n
j
mz
 
 
Figure 1 
Matrix representation of the probabilistic apportioning of items in S0(N) to conditions on 
event E given amelioration by act A
j
  
 
 
Some problem presentations neglect to explicitly present an apportioning to a consequence 
state on the grounds that this is logically implied by the consequence states that are presented 
(this is so with the original Kahneman-Tversky ‘Asian Disease’ problem). It is presumed that 
the decision-maker will recognise this, but it may impact on the latitude for decision-maker to 
elaborate a Local Mental Model of the problem (Gigerenzer, et al, 1991). In this case the 
modal operator ‘฀฀’ (‘is necessarily the case’) is used to indicate this condition within the 
formalism. Thus: 
 
  ฀฀ [E(pe) | Aj ฀⇒ (njki , S+/-k , pi)] 
 
Implies the decision-maker is left to deduce this proposition. 
 
The framing effect occurs if there is a violation of invariance with a reversal in preferences: 
 
A
s+ 
, A
r+
 , A
s - 
, A
r-
 ฀∈ A   
A
s+ 
 A
r+
 and 
 
A
r-
  A
s-
 
With  indicating strict preference.  
 
Attribute framing 
 
Attribute framing relates to choice over an item or set of items in which the decision-maker is 
called upon to either accept or reject and option, to select a preferred option from a set or rate 
an option given a description of the option (or option set) on the basis of a description of the 
attributes of the option set. 
 
The decision concerns a set, G of N ฀≥ 2 of items Gj ฀∈ G , where Gj may itself be a set of 
objects. G
j
 may be described in terms of gi , bi ฀∈ F with F a set of decision-salient attributes 
where g has a positive and b a negative valence  
 
The decision-maker is called upon to accept or reject an option G
j
 ฀∈ G , rate its 
(un)attractiveness on a numeric or verbal scale or express preference for ฀∃Gj ฀∈ G. Again. it is 
presumed that ฀∀i gi ฀≡ Ńbi , bi ฀≡ Ńgi and gi ŀ bi = ฀∅ . gi and bi are quantified for ฀∀Gj ฀∈ G at a 
level q
j
(gi) ฀∈ [0 , 1] and qj(bi) = 1 – qj(gi) , g and b being antonymic. The level may of course 
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 be represented more meaningfully to the decision-maker as a percentage or numerical ratio. 
For ฀∀Gj ฀∈ G  the attribute g at level qj(g) may be definite or, more generally, it may occur 
over a probability distribution (q
j
(gi) , p
j
(gi)) . ฀∀g , b ฀∈ F , p(gi) = p(bi) . By implication, the 
distribution of the negative valence attribute for G
j
 is (g
j
(bi) , p
j
(bi))  = ((1 – g
j
(gi)) , p
j
(gi)) . It 
is presumed that the decision-maker has monotonic preferences over ฀∀Gj ฀∈ G , qj(g) ฀≥ qk(g) , 
p
j
(g) ฀≥ pk(g) ฀⇒ Gj  Gk . Each option Gj ฀∈ G is then described by a proposition of the form: 
 
[G
j+
] = ฀∧i [Gj , qji(g) , pji(g)]  
[G
j-
] = ฀∧i [Gj , (1 - qji(b)) , pji(b))] 
This may be read as, for the positive frame “[Option G
j+
 has a (positive valence) attribute g at 
a level q
j
i(g) with probability p
j
i(g)]” or for the negative frame “[Option G
j-
 has a (negative 
valence) attribute b at a level (1 - q
j
i(b)) with probability p
j
i(b)]”. The full description of the 
choice option combines linearly over probabilities. The expectation of the positive attribute 
for G
j+
 is then E(Gj(g)) = i g
j
(gi)) . p
j
(gi)) . Normatively, a rational decision-maker might be 
expected to maximise this. 
 
The framing effect occurs if G
j+
 is accepted, while G
j-
 is rejected (or vice versa), if the relative 
(un)attractiveness rating of G
j+
, G
j-
  is consistently different or that over pairwise preference 
G
j+
  G
j-
 reverses to G
j+
  G
j- 
.  
 
A graphical representation of the options in G is illustrated in figure 2. In this the horizontal 
bars normalised to a length of unity are divided into lengths representing the level of positive 
and negative attribute, q
j
i(g) and q
j
i (b) = (1 – q
j
i (g)). The height of the bar represents p
j
i (g) = 
p
j
i (b)  . The area i g
j
(gi)) . p
j
(gi)) is proportional to the expectation of the positive attribute 
for Gj . 
 
:
qj(g)
qj(b) = (1 - qj(g))
0
1
1
0
qj1(b)
qj2(b)
qji(b)
qjn(b)
qj1(g)
qj2(g)
qji(g)
qjn(g)
pj1
pj2
pji
pjn
:
Gj
:
:
 
 
Figure 2 
Graphical representation of the parameter space for an attribute framing problem
 
 
Goal framing 
 
A goal framing decision problem is one in which the terms are an individual or item, Q 
(which may be the decision-maker herself, or may invoke he decision-maker as agent on 
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 behalf of another individual or organisation) is in an initial condition S0 . The individual or 
item will transit to a new condition out of a partitioned set  
 = {S1 ,…, Sm}, Si ฀∩ Sj = ฀∅ over a probability distribution p = {p1 ,…, pz}, ฀∀p ฀∈ [0 , 1] . It 
is supposed that the decision-maker has a preference ordering over these conditions, ranked 
such that: S1  S2  ,…,  Sm , where  indicates a complete, transitive weak ordering. 
 
The decision-maker has available a set of projects P = {P1 ,…, Pn} that ameliorates the 
probability of the individual or item transiting to the conditions in  . I.e.: 
 
P : S0 ฀→   
 
It is supposed that a null project (‘do nothing’) P
0
 is available (though this may not be 
presented as an option to the decision-maker), thus S0 ฀∈  ,  P0 : S0 ฀→ S0 . 
The instrumentality of a project P
i
 in achieving a condition Sj for the individual or item is 
defined as: 
 
I(P
i
 , Sj) = p(Sj | P
i
) + p(\Sj | ฀¬PPi) - 1  
 
Which might be read as ‘[If project Pi is undertaken, then there is a probability p(Sj | P
i
) that 
state Sj will occur and if project Pi is not undertaken then there is a probability p(\Sj | ฀¬PPi) 
that state S  will not occur]’. The ‘not undertake Pj
i
 action, ฀¬PiP  may be defined in terms of do 
nothing, P
0
 , undertake an alternative project, Pj (thus indicating opportunity cost of P
i
 versus 
PP
j
) or, potentially, some weighted sum of alternative projects (P
k฀≠i
). The instrumentality 
metric takes a value of +1 if instigating P
i
 guarantees the delivery of Q to condition S  , if Pj i is 
not undertaken then it is definite that ŃS  will occur; at I =  -1 the project guarantees that Q 
will not be in condition S  (otherwise it will) and at 0 the project has no influence on whether 
Q will be in condition S  or not (the project has no instrumentality). By definition ฀∀S  ฀∈   , 
I(P
j
j
j j
0
 , S ) = 0 . The ‘inherent’ probability of S  is specified as p(S  | Pj j j
0
) . The overall structure 
of the problem may be depicted schematically as in figure 3. 
 
Each project P
j
 ฀∈ P might then be regarded as being described in terms of a combination of 
atomic propositions of the form: 
 
[P
j+
]
 ฀≡ ฀∧j [p(Sj+ | Pi) ฀∧ p(\Sj+ | ฀¬PPi)] 
[P
j-
]
 ฀≡ ฀∧j [p(Sj- | Pi) ฀∧ p(\Sj- | ฀¬PPi)] 
 
Which might be read as a linear combination over all potential states of propositions of the 
form “[Given that project P
i
 is undertaken then the item will transit to condition Sj with a 
probability p(Sj
+/-
 | P
i
) ; if the project is not undertaken, then the item will not transit to 
condition Sj (that is, will go to some other condition) with a probability p(\Sj
+/-
 | ฀¬PPi) ”  
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 Figure 3 
Graphical representation of the parameter space for a goal framing problem
p(Sg|P
i)
p(Sb|฀¬Pi)
0
1
1
1
I(Sg , P
j) = 0
P(Sg | P
0)
 
 
The 
+/-
 superscript indicates that an positive or negative valence term  
may be used to describe the condition to create the positive and negatively framed problem 
respectively.  
 
The framing effect is said to occur if P
j+
 is indicated as acceptable and P
j-
 is indicated as 
unacceptable (or vice versa) or if P
j + 
 P
k + 
and P
j -
 P
k-
 . 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Map of the parameter space for a two-state goal framing problem 
 
Pi : S0
S1
S2
Sj
Sm
:
:
:
:
p(S1 | Pi)
p(S2 | Pi)
p(Sj | Pi)
p(Sm | Pi)
฀¬Pi : S0
:
:
:
:
p(S1 | ฀¬Pi)
p(S2 | ฀¬Pi)
p(Sj | ฀¬Pi)
p(Sm | ฀¬Pi)
S1
S2
Sj
Sm
p(฀¬S1 | ฀¬Pi) =
(1 - p(S1 | ฀¬Pi))
 
It is worthwhile to consider the restricted case of Q transiting to one of three conditions, 
retention in S0 or transit to a ‘good’ state Sg or a ‘bad’ state Sb with  
Sg  S0 Sb . The ‘do nothing’ option is not available. This represents the majority of goal 
framing decision problems and has an interesting graphical representation. Consider figure 4. 
This represents a graph of p(Sg | P
i
) against p(Sb | ฀¬PPi). This implies that the top-left – bottom-
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 left diagonal represents the instrumentality of project P
i
 on a scale of [-1 , +1] and the bottom-
left – top-right diagonal represents the inherent probability of S  , p(S  | Pg g
0
) on a scale of [0 , 
1] .  
 
The full set of project options, P is then represented by a map of points within the graph. 
Points above the top-left – bottom-left instrumentality diagonal reflect projects with a positive 
instrumentality that contribute to the delivery of Sg while points below the diagonal have a 
negative instrumentality and hinder delivery of Sg . 
 
 
Potential extensions of the formalism 
 
The formalism developed here has potential for extension into problems where probabilities 
are vague or where receipt is complicated by factors other than or in addition to risk. 
 
Ambiguity represents a decision condition in which probabilities are available but (in contrast 
to the condition of strict risk) these are not precisely known or there is reason to doubt their 
veracity. Ambiguity is a more common condition than risk in many decision contexts and is 
known to influence decision-making in a number of ways that violate expected utility theory 
independently of risk (Ellsberg, 1961; 2001; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986).  Hogarth & Einhorn 
(1990) develop a model that integrates ambiguous probabilities into prospect theory 
probability weighting.  A series of studies of framing under ambiguous probabilities 
(indicated by either probability ranges or adjectival qualifiers to definite probabilities) 
conducted by Kuhn (1997) suggests that (with some order effect qualifiers) under negative 
frames, preference for vague probability options increased. As probabilities (with clear 
distinction between probabilities of event occurrence, outcome likelihood or option character) 
are made explicit within the formalism it is straightforward to integrate vague probabilities be 
they specified by probability range, adjectival qualifier, second order probability distribution 
or fuzzy set representation. 
 
Many project decisions do not consider specific projects in isolation, but rather as tactical 
contributions to an overall strategic goal. This means that projects must be considered in the 
way in which they support or hinder each other, as well as the way in which they reflect upon 
each other as opportunity costs. The formal description of goal framing can accommodate this 
by invoking the instrumentality of two (or more) concurrent or sequential projects in relation 
to delivering specific preferred states.   
 
In addition to risk decision-makers are often called upon to make choices under conditions 
where receipt is delayed (intertemporal choice) 
[2]
, options must be evaluated in terms of a 
number of desirable or undesirable attributes (multiattribute choice) or the decision-maker 
holds concern for the distribution of outcomes to others as well as self (social choice). In all 
cases, receipt may be under conditions of risk or certainty.  
 
Reflecting the tradition of distinct research streams into these different decision dilemmas, 
framing research has been largely concerned with immediate, single-attribute non-social 
choice under risk. Progression of research into the impact of framing on decision with 
complexity other than, or extra to, risk remains an opportunity. The potential for extending the 
formalism into describing decision problems in these areas is recognised. 
 
 
                                                 
[2]
 A number of anomalies in Intertemporal choice parallel those of choice under uncertainty. See 
Prelec & Loewenstein  (1991). 
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 Conclusions 
 
Framing effects offer a clear indication of (ostensibly irrational) psychological effects in 
economic and personal decision-making. They have been demonstrated in a number or 
decision arenas including the managerial, health and political (though travel behaviour is quite 
neglected). They are influential for both espoused and practical decision-making and have 
potential to impact on personal economic well-being. The formalism described here has the 
potential to both provide a rigorous description of extant decision stimuli and in clarifying 
their full logical scope the creation of new stimuli. It also provides a metric of decision 
stimuli complexity.  One immediate application is the recognition of potential for and 
investigation into the effect of framing biases in stated-choice test instruments. 
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